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Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of
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Robert Barnett
1 Melvyn Goldstein, the leading Western scholar of twentieth century Tibetan language
and political history, has always been exceptionally productive, and his latest work is a
600-page study of just half a decade – the first five years of the incorporation of Tibet
into the People’s Republic. Much of his work has been controversial, with nationalist
critics among Tibetans often impugning his intentions instead of taking on the much
more productive task of trying to match his prodigious scholarship and knowledge. The
climate of debate has improved as more Tibetan exile scholars have emerged, and the
current  volume is  likely  to  stimulate  important  and productive  debate  rather  than
calumny. 
2 It also contains much that will be new, perhaps startling, even to readers familiar with
this critical period in Tibetan and Chinese history, for the early 1950s were the only
years  when Chinese efforts  to  win Tibetan cooperation were –  almost  –  stunningly
successful.  In  1954 the Communist  generals  stationed in  Lhasa  persuaded the Dalai
Lama, then 19 years old, to travel to Beijing, where Mao lavished on him attention and
praise  that  were  earnestly  reciprocated.  Goldstein  sympathetically  chronicles  the
admiration that the young lama developed for China’s leader at that time, something
that  the  older  Dalai  Lama  has  often  since  discussed.  Goldstein  also  shows  the
extraordinary  lengths  to  which  Party  officials  went  to  assuage  Tibetan  doubts,
especially in terms of protocol. We learn, for example, that after their first meeting
Mao walked the Dalai Lama to his car and opened the door for him. But we are also
shown the astonishing importance attached by the Chinese to winning over the Dalai
Lama: when the then Party Secretary of Sichuan, Li Jingquan, refused to greet the Dalai
Lama  (who  was  furious)  on  his  arrival  in  Chengdu  in  1955,  the  Party’s  Central
Committee immediately had Premier Zhou Enlai fly to the city on his way back from the
Bandung Conference to repair the damage. On his return to Lhasa, the Tibetan leader
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gave his first public political  speech (the date and venue are not given),  showing a
positive  commitment  to  the  new  situation,  but  carefully  placing  the  emphasis  on
equality and gradualism: “The Chinese nationality cadres living here came to help us
because we couldn’t manage secular matters well. They didn’t come to be our lord.”
Within five years, trust between the two sides had collapsed and has yet to be restored. 
3 The Calm before the Storm hints at some of the factors that in the author’s view led to the
breakdown  of  relations.  Its  first  part,  drawing  on  the  pioneering  work  of  Tsering
Shakya,  John  Kenneth  Knaus,1 and  the  previous  volume  of  Goldstein’s  history,  The
Demise of the Lamaist State,2 shows that, except for the coterie around the Panchen Lama,
Tibetans were forced unwillingly into China’s embrace. The British and the Indians had
avoided  responsibility  when  faced  with  the  Tibetans’  last-minute  effort  to  get
international support in 1950 (a phenomenon that has only gotten worse: in 1950 the
British  described  their  treaty-bound  recognition  of  Tibet’s  autonomous  status  as
wrapped in “legal obscurity” (67), whereas in 2008 they said it was “anachronistic” and
“outdated”). The United States secretly offered support to the Tibetans, but, as Tibetan
officials noticed immediately, the American letters were ambiguous, always conditional
on Indian support, and never signed or on headed paper. This led to the reluctant but
inevitable decision of the Tibetan leadership to finally accept the 17 Point Agreement
with China in 1951. 
4 If the first part of the book describes the dysfunctional response of the international
community to China’s absorption of Tibet, the second part reveals the intense internal
conflicts  within  both the  Tibetan  and  the  Chinese  elites  in  Lhasa.  The  traditional
Tibetan government in Lhasa was allowed to remain in office after 1950, but its cabinet
ministers were trying to accommodate and soften Chinese demands at the same time as
its prime ministers routinely had shouting matches with their Chinese counterparts.
The Chinese side was even more divided: the officials sent to Lhasa by Peng Dehuai’s
Northwestern Military Region waged an astonishingly bitter internal campaign against
the dominant Southwest faction, originally led by Deng Xiaoping, demanding that what
is now the TAR be divided into two regions, one for their protégé the Panchen Lama
and the other for the Dalai Lama, with land reform to be carried out immediately by the
former. Mao finally overruled that proposal in 1954 and gave the Dalai Lama superior
status (Goldstein includes the internal report on that controversy in full, 436-50), but
the dispute shows the willingness of the Tibetan officials around the young Panchen
Lama to wreck any semblance of Tibetan unity. Mao’s decision to delay rapid change in
Tibet in large part reflected practical military constraints:  the Chinese troops faced
enormous  difficulties  in  trying  to  obtain  sufficient  food  for  their  troops  without
triggering hyper-inflation in the newly occupied areas. 
5 The last part of the book focuses on the efforts of the traditional Tibetan government to
introduce social reforms in 1953 and the honeymoon visit to Beijing a year later. Hints
as to why the efforts to achieve workable compromise were later to fail point mainly to
the Tibetan leaders who “had no common voice and no clear strategy for dealing with
their new status as part of the People’s Republic of China” (544), to a “fake” nationalist
movement called “The People’s Association” that petitioned the Chinese to withdraw
their troops, and to the shadowy anti-Chinese machinations of exile Tibetan aristocrats
in India and America. Goldstein, in his most contentious account, suggests that letters
sent by the three elder brothers of the Dalai Lama to the Americans and others could be
read as falsely insinuating that they had the personal support of the Dalai Lama for
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their efforts to organise anti-Chinese resistance. If so, it is a tactic that is still current in
exile  politics,  including  among Westerners.  The  author’s  full  view of  the  causes  of
conflict will not become clear until his next volume, which can be expected to include
the disastrous Chinese policies imposed in the eastern Tibetan areas, but one can sense
unease at the rough methods used by Tibetans opposed to Chinese rule, perhaps not
least because they failed. 
6 The book includes numerous primary materials drawn from Chinese official sources,
unique contemporary documents, and important oral histories, often quoted in full,
making this collection of great value for the study of this era (despite the author’s
decision to provide most Tibetan words only as a rough approximation of their sound
instead of the much more important transliteration). However, this work will not help
those seeking to  settle  ethical  disputes  about  China’s  role  in Tibet  –  it  is  a  critical
account of decision-making by elites, not a study of ordinary Tibetans’ experience of
their uninvited rulers, and it does not include the eastern Tibetan areas. Its narrative
framework  centres  on  a  pragmatist question:  Could  the  Tibetans  have  acted  more
efficiently to avoid conflict and achieve a better compromise? That question presents
itself  as self-evident, because in those years Mao was astonishingly moderate in his
policy instructions on Tibet,  and because his  machine was extraordinarily  efficient.
There is a kind of Weberian teleology to this perspective, in which the Tibetans, with
their  aristocrats  and  monasteries,  disputes  and  conspiracies,  necessarily  appear  as
wanting. But if framed within, say, a comparison to the Qing attempts to incorporate
Tibet 50 years earlier, or the British efforts in India in the nineteenth century, or the
Soviets in Central Asia, a very different narrative would emerge in which the internal
divisions among the Tibetans, and even their dissimulations and mimetic pleadings to
foreign powers, might appear as effects of the power relations at the time rather than
as cultural failings. 
7 Incidental moments in the Chinese documents – such as General Zhang Jingwu’s public
mockery of Tibetans who suggested it was unsafe for the Dalai Lama to travel by plane
to Beijing (482), or Mao’s dreams of exploiting Tibet for minerals (510-11) – suggest
other  interpretations  that  later  scholars  will  hopefully  explore  using  these  rich
materials. Goldstein’s fascinating work does not stray into such areas, but it leaves one
to wonder just when scholars in China will finally start using the tools of post-colonial
critique to understand their Tibetan project – and, for that matter, to ask why, as Peter
Hansen pointed out six years ago,3 leading post-colonialist scholars in India and the
West seem so reluctant to apply their  own methods to Beijing’s  troubled efforts  to
incorporate Tibet into China. 
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